Quiet escalation: the official position

At a briefing, the head of the Central Directorate for Innovative Activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Vitaliy Dobryanskyi outlined the main risks from Russia in 2026: cyberspace, air defense and challenges related to artificial intelligence and Asian-made weapon systems. This is not loud rhetoric — it is a signal for systemic changes in defense approaches.

"If I say that we predicted this and that, that it will hit somewhere there, then they [the Russians] will change it. There will definitely be issues in cyberspace, there will definitely be issues in air defense, so we will need to change our approaches"

— Vitaliy Dobryanskyi, Head of the Central Directorate for Innovative Activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

What lies behind the words: why this matters

Russia is actively diversifying sources of weapons and tactics: purchases in the Asian sector allow it to circumvent some restrictions and increase the number of munitions and strike means. Cyber operations and the introduction of AI elements are changing the character of combat — from automated reconnaissance to more precise guidance. For Ukraine this means that old air defense and logistics principles lose effectiveness without updates to tactics and technologies.

Evidence and context

Available facts confirm these concerns: Ukrainian units have repeatedly detected and destroyed Asian-made equipment. For example, in September 2025 Ukrainian operators struck four North Korean Koksan self-propelled guns; Koksan were first recorded on the front in February 2025 in Luhansk Oblast. Intelligence data also indicated that as of July 2025 North Korea had transferred millions of shells and hundreds of artillery systems to Russia — a fact that alters the balance of ammunition stocks on the battlefield.

Consequences for the Armed Forces of Ukraine

First and foremost this is a question of adaptation: air defense layers need to become more flexible — more mobile modules, integration of EW (electronic warfare), improvement of reconnaissance and target identification systems. Investments in the cybersecurity of supply chains and command, training personnel to counter the enemy's automated systems, and developing countermeasures against the use of AI in hostile guidance systems are also important.

What partners should do

This is not only a matter of equipment but of policy: deliveries of modern air defense systems, support in cyber defense and the sharing of intelligence are markers of partners' trust. Investments in training, joint exercises and the exchange of experience in countering Asian-made weapon systems and hostile AI systems will accelerate the adaptation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Final emphasis

Dobryanskyi's words are not about panic, but about the enemy's predictable logic and the need to respond to it systemically. The question is not only the quantity of weapons, but how we detect them, neutralize them and integrate our countermeasures. Are we ready to accelerate modernization of air defense, cyber protection and analytics to turn these challenges into a controlled risk?