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Riyadh Offers Middle East Helsinki — But Without the Mechanism That Made Those Helsinki Work

Saudi Arabia is discussing a non-aggression pact with regional partners modeled on Iran's 1975 agreement. The problem: the original Helsinki Accords worked due to institutional monitoring, which is currently absent in the new draft.

Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

By Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

May 15, 2026 · 3 min read

Riyadh Offers Middle East Helsinki — But Without the Mechanism That Made Those Helsinki Work
Іран (Ілюстративне фото: Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA)

Saudi Arabia is holding consultations with Middle Eastern allies regarding a regional non-aggression pact with Iran — as part of a broader search for a security architecture in the post-active conflict phase. This was reported by Financial Times citing unnamed diplomats. Riyadh is looking to the 1970s Helsinki Process as a model. But that is where the main problem begins.

What Helsinki Really Is

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on August 1, 1975, by thirty-five states — including the USSR, USA, and Canada — was not merely a declarative document. It established three blocks of commitments: international security, economic cooperation, and the humanitarian dimension. The key was not the text, but the mechanism: regular monitoring meetings, the so-called "Madrid" and "Vienna" continuations of the process, which allowed for documenting violations and maintaining dialogue even during crises. This is what made Helsinki an instrument, not a gesture.

What Saudi Arabia Is Proposing — and What Is Missing

According to two Western diplomats familiar with the negotiations, Riyadh is still conducting discussions at a conceptual level — without specific verification mechanisms, without defined participants, and without Iran's formal response. According to analysis by Caspian Post, for a Middle Eastern version of Helsinki to function, it would require at least: mutual commitments against attacks on civilian infrastructure, maritime guarantees in the Persian Gulf, mechanisms to prevent escalation through proxy forces, and regular diplomatic consultations. None of these elements are present in the publicly known parameters of the Saudi initiative so far.

"Success will depend less on formal declarations and more on whether crisis management mechanisms are created"

Caspian Post analysts, commenting on Riyadh's initiative

Why Iran Is the Most Complex Variable

Tehran's regional influence is built not on direct actions, but on a network of allies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, pro-Iranian formations in Iraq and Syria. Any pact between states does not formally obligate these structures. This means: even if Iran signs a non-aggression declaration, the question of proxy escalation remains open — and this very question is the root cause of most crisis episodes of the past decade.

A separate issue is the absence of Israel. Unlike the Helsinki Process, where all key European military players sat at the table, in the Middle East the region's largest nuclear power and the primary target of Iranian rhetoric remains outside the framework of any such negotiations.

European Support — and What Stands Behind It

European governments and EU institutions have supported the Saudi initiative, according to diplomats cited by FT. This makes sense: Brussels has long sought a non-military instrument to influence regional stability. But "support" currently means approval of the concept, not participation in developing a binding mechanism — which are fundamentally different things.

  • No verification — it is unclear who will document violations and with what consequences
  • No defined participants — it has not been officially determined which regional states are signing the pact
  • No Tehran position — there has been no public Iranian response to the proposal
  • No solution regarding proxies — the most acute dimension of Iran's regional presence remains outside the discussion

Helsinki 1975 became a precedent not because states made promises, but because these promises were institutionally verified — and even the USSR could not ignore monitoring pressure. If the Saudi initiative stops at the level of declaration without a similar mechanism, it will repeat the fate not of the Helsinki Act, but of the Budapest Memorandum — a document whose signatories continue to dispute exactly what they signed.

The question is not whether Iran will agree to sign the pact. The question is whether the document will contain even a single line about what will happen when it is violated — and by whom.

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May 26, 2026