The Intelligence Center of Estonia's Defense Forces does not record any signs of Russia preparing for a strike on the Baltic region. But its commander, Colonel Antts Kivilev, formulates a warning more precisely than any alert: the absence of rational grounds for aggression is not a guarantee of its absence.

"Rationally — opening a new front makes no sense for Russia. But we have already seen that the RF is not always rational in its decisions and can make strategic miscalculations".

Colonel Antts Kivilev, head of the Intelligence Center of Estonia's Defense Forces, ERR

This is not rhetoric. This is an operational framework: intelligence assesses intentions and capabilities, but cannot model irrational decisions by top leadership — the very type of decisions that led to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

What NATO has already done — and what it's worth

After February 2022, the Alliance significantly increased its presence on the eastern flank. In September 2025, following a series of airspace violations by Russian drones and aircraft over Estonia, Finland, Poland and other NATO members, the Alliance launched Operation Eastern Sentry — enhanced surveillance activities along the eastern border. Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed the incidents without resorting to escalatory rhetoric.

Estonia's foreign intelligence service formulates its public assessment cautiously: "Russia has no intention to conduct a military attack on Estonia or any other NATO member state in the near term" — and adds that this assessment will remain unchanged as long as Europe maintains steps that force the Kremlin to calculate risks.

The threat window: when "not now" stops being an answer

Lithuanian intelligence assesses that Moscow may be ready for a "large-scale military conflict" with NATO in approximately six years. Rutte in June 2025 spoke of a five-year horizon — considering the pace of increasing production of tanks, armored vehicles and missiles. French military analysts record a similar time corridor: until 2030.

Kivilev fits into this consensus, but emphasizes something different: not on the time horizon, but on the nature of the risk. The danger lies not in planned aggression, but in strategic miscalculation: the Kremlin may overestimate its forces or underestimate the Western response — just as it did in February 2022.

Narva as an indicator

In parallel, Estonian counterintelligence is recording information operations around Narva — a city with a predominantly Russian-speaking population on the border with Russia. Calls for sabotage and narratives about a "People's Republic of Narva" are being spread online. According to intelligence assessments, this could be part of preparation for a scenario similar to 2014 in Ukraine — destabilization up to the threshold of direct armed conflict.

• December 2025: a group of Russian border guards crossed the border into Estonia — the incident remains without official explanation from Moscow.
• September 2025: systematic airspace violations by NATO countries — Operation Eastern Sentry was launched in response.
• NATO expands battle groups on the eastern flank from enhanced battalion to brigade level.

Kivilev is not sounding an alarm — he is calibrating. And therein lies the key message: if the intelligence service of a country bordering Russia says "we see no signs of preparation, but we do not rule out miscalculation" — this is not reassurance, it is technical honesty about the limits of intelligence forecasting.

The question that remains open: is the current level of NATO presence on the Baltic flank sufficient to deter the Kremlin from an irrational move — if Russia decides that a frozen conflict in Ukraine gives it temporary strategic space?