While the Ministry of Defense has not published any document on the redistribution of mobilization powers, LIGA.net sources in the Interior Ministry have already called the idea a "sacrifice of the police." This is a telling detail: the ministry responded to oral proposals before they took any official form.

What is being proposed and who is proposing it

People's Deputy and secretary of the parliamentary committee on national security Roman Kostenko described the essence of the idea: take from the TCC the functions of patrolling, document verification, and delivery of draft evaders — and transfer them to the National Police. According to him, the initiative currently exists only at the discussion level and is not a final decision. The Ministry of Defense has not officially confirmed this.

Kostenko himself is skeptical about its effectiveness: he admits that such a step is unlikely to solve the problem of "busification" — it will only change who carries it out.

Why the Interior Ministry is against it — and what lies behind it

The current distribution of functions looks like this: the National Police participates in alert measures exclusively at the request of the TCC, can carry out administrative detention and delivery of draft evaders — but only as an auxiliary force, not as an initiator. Minister Klymenko has repeatedly stressed: organizing the mobilization process is not the responsibility of the Interior Ministry.

If the powers are transferred, the police will transform from an auxiliary tool into the main one. This is the essence of the internal conflict: not a technical question of "who patrols," but a question of institutional responsibility and reputational risks for a ministry that is simultaneously responsible for maintaining public trust in law and order.

"Busification" as a phenomenon arose not because the TCC had insufficient powers — but because the system operated without clear procedures and public oversight.

Analytical consensus of parliamentary discussions on TCC reform, March–April 2025

Structural trap

In 2024, the relevant committee blocked a provision that would have placed alert functions on local self-government bodies. Then the burden remained on the military. Now the idea is to shift it to the police. Both decisions share one thing: avoiding systemic solutions in favor of shifting institutional responsibility.

• TCC — criticized for forceful methods and lack of transparency
• Police — values its status as a civilian law enforcement body
• Local self-government — received a rejection of these powers back in 2024
• Legislative framework — still lacks a clear mechanism to control any of these bodies during mobilization activities

It is telling that none of the participants in the discussion frames the question differently: not "how to make the process transparent and lawful," but "who should bear the burden that already causes public rejection."

What's next

Until the Ministry of Defense submits a draft law, the dispute remains departmental — and the Interior Ministry, judging by the sources' reaction, hopes it stays that way. But if a document does appear, the key indicator will not be the redistribution of powers itself, but whether a mechanism for citizens to appeal police actions appears alongside it — something that didn't exist in the TCC and which became the main public complaint.

If the draft law is submitted without such a mechanism — will the Interior Ministry agree to assume powers that have already destroyed another ministry's reputation?