What’s happening

According to a comment to LIGA.net from a representative of the association of former Belarusian security officers BelPol, more than 500 Belarusian enterprises are currently involved in fulfilling Russian defense orders. This covers a wide range of products — from ammunition to electronics that are critical for modern weapons.

What they produce

Names mentioned include artillery shells, rocket projectiles for the MLRS “Grad”, microchips, tank optics and control units for strategic systems (the “Satana” and “Avangard” are cited). MZKT in Minsk, the interlocutor says, is working “day and night,” manufacturing chassis for “Iskanders” and platforms compatible with the S-400.

"What is happening in Belarus now is the complete dissolution of the country’s economy in the Russian 'meat grinder.'"

— Representative of BelPol, the association of former Belarusian security officers (commenting to LIGA.net)

"Belarus is preparing for war. Not necessarily against Ukraine. It could easily be the Baltics."

— Representative of BelPol (commenting to LIGA.net)

Timelines and scale

BelPol and sources in Ukrainian intelligence indicate that new defense-sector enterprises in Belarus could reach full capacity in 2027–2029. Some plants have modernization deadlines — the first half of 2027. For example: a hull-production plant is planned to launch in mid-2026 with a potential output of about 120,000 shells of 152 mm and 122 mm calibers per year.

Where components come from

According to BelPol interlocutors, Belarus is supplementing its needs by purchasing explosives from Iran, China and Russia, and some equipment from China and India. Also mentioned is the practice of rerouting component shipments to bypass sanctions from the US, Japan or Taiwan.

Why this matters for Ukraine

First, it reduces Russia’s dependence on imports for critical items and shortens the time needed to restore ammunition stocks. Second, producing chassis and control systems in Belarus increases the flexibility of deploying missile and air-defense elements in the region. Third, the militarization of legislation and society in Belarus raises the risks of escalation beyond Ukraine.

Context of events

In December 2025, sources say, Belarus deployed equipment to guide “Shahed” loitering munitions at high-rise buildings. On January 1 there was another announcement about joint nuclear developments between Belarus and Russia. On February 18 Ukraine imposed sanctions on Alexander Lukashenko for facilitating the continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine — measures responding to this line of developments.

What to do — practical conclusions

We are facing not only a political but also an industrial challenge. The analytical conclusion is simple: by 2027 there could be a substantial increase in production capacity, so partners and Ukraine need to act now — focus on disrupting supply chains for critical components, strengthening intelligence and cyber operations to complicate plant modernization, and agreeing on sanction instruments that would prevent circumvention of restrictions.

Summary

Belarus’s industrial integration into Russia’s military logistics shortens the time required to restore and build up strike capability. This creates a window — several years — during which the international community and Ukraine can and should turn declarations into concrete countermeasures. Whether partners will turn statements into practical action by 2027 is a question on which the security of the region will depend.