On the night of May 17, Ukraine's Defense Forces delivered one of the largest strikes against Moscow and Moscow region throughout the entire war. Over 120 unmanned aerial vehicles attacked the Russian capital — despite three layers of air defense systems that theoretically were supposed to stop even cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

Why the "unthinkable" became possible

Ivan Kirichevsky — a serviceman of the 413th Regiment of Unmanned Systems Forces "Raid," who participated in the attack — is cautious in his statements. According to him, claiming that the Russians were caught by surprise does not hold true.

"Something unthinkable happened for the entire world, because the air defense of the Moscow region in theory should have repelled massive attacks by cruise missiles with nuclear warheads from NATO bombers, but something happened to it, and it did not repel an attack with a combination of various means."

Ivan Kirichevsky, 413th Regiment of Unmanned Systems Forces "Raid" — Espreso

According to him, before the attack on Moscow, the Defense Forces conducted systematic work from various directions — in particular, the effective destruction of elements of the Russian air defense system. The "Raid" regiment was among the units that participated in this.

This is confirmed by data from the Ministry of Defense: in April alone, the Defense Forces damaged at least 25 enemy air defense systems and radars. The ISW documented that Russia acknowledged a critical shortage of anti-aircraft missiles following a series of Ukrainian strikes, and Russian military personnel complained about air defense overload.

What is RS-1 "Bars" and why Berlin is in this equation

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirmed that Ukrainian developments were used for strikes on Moscow region — RS-1 "Bars", FP-1 "Firepoint," and BARS-SM "GLADIATOR."

"Bars" is a hybrid of a cruise missile and a jet drone. It is launched from a container with a powder charge, then unfolds its wings and proceeds on its route. Range — up to 800 km, warhead — approximately 50 kg. Key advantage: the ability to change flight trajectory in real time, which complicates interception by conventional air defense means. The developer is not disclosed, but funding was partially provided by Germany.

Kirichevsky noted that before the attack, only general characteristics of "Bars" were known — on May 17, the weapon underwent its first combat test over the most protected airspace in Russia.

What was destroyed and why it matters for the defense industry

Among the damaged targets — the "Angstrom" plant in Zelenograd: the enterprise produces microchips and semiconductors for Russian high-precision weapons and is under U.S. sanctions. In 2016, it was personally visited by then-Prime Minister Medvedev, who called it "the pride of Russian electronics." Following the strike, a fire broke out at the facility.

• Solnechnogorsk pumping station — part of the oil pipeline infrastructure of Moscow region
• Moscow Oil Refinery — fire visible from various districts of the capital
• Command posts and drone control centers
• Belbek airfield in Crimea — a separate SBU operation as part of the same night

Military analyst Pavel Narozhniy noted that the strike on "Angstrom" is more serious from a military perspective than the strike on the oil refinery: microchips from Zelenograd go directly into missile production.

A deficit that cannot be quickly compensated

Kirichevsky estimates the overall potential of Russian air defense at approximately one thousand launch systems — up to 700 S-300/400s, plus "Tor," "Buk," and "Pantsir." However, the missiles for them are becoming increasingly scarce. The production cycle for a single anti-aircraft missile for S-400 class systems is 20–25 months. Transferring spare complexes to Moscow by stripping other sectors — would mean leaving them undefended. This is precisely the dilemma that, according to Kirichevsky, the Defense Forces are exploiting.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Russians to maneuver air defense systems between sectors — this is the main tactical conclusion from the night of May 17, rather than the number of shot-down drones, which Moscow traditionally exaggerates.

If Ukraine continues to systematically destroy air defense elements throughout the depth of Russian territory — and in parallel increases the production of "Bars" and its analogues — the next massive attack on Moscow could occur under conditions where Russia can no longer even claim 120 intercepted targets.