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Ukraine Spends More on Ballistic Interception Than the West Produces for It: What Lies Behind Zelenskyy's Claim of Patriot Shortage

While the US and its allies spend PAC-3 missiles in the Middle East, Ukraine faces a shortage that Zelenskyy himself described as critical. The mathematics of production versus consumption does not favor Kyiv.

Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

By Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

April 15, 2026 · 3 min read

Ukraine Spends More on Ballistic Interception Than the West Produces for It: What Lies Behind Zelenskyy's Claim of Patriot Shortage
Володимир Зеленський (Фото: ОП)

In an interview with German television channel ZDF, President Volodymyr Zelensky said something that his circle typically phrases more diplomatically: «We currently have such a shortage [of Patriot missiles] that it cannot be worse». This is not rhetoric — behind this phrase stands concrete arithmetic that leaves no room for optimism.

One production line — two theaters of war

According to analysts, Ukraine needs approximately 60 PAC-3 missiles monthly to intercept Russian ballistics. Lockheed Martin produces about 600 such missiles per year — that is, 50 per month — and distributes them among U.S. military warehouses, NATO allies, and partners. Even without the Middle East, the balance was in deficit.

After the U.S. began active operations against Iran, the situation worsened. As reported by The Wall Street Journal, the Pentagon signed a record $4.7 billion contract with Lockheed Martin to accelerate PAC-3 MSE production — with the goal of increasing output to two thousand missiles per year by 2030. But 2030 is not 2025.

«If the war continues longer, there will be less weapons for Ukraine»

Volodymyr Zelensky, ZDF interview

Zelensky also clarified in conversation with Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg: «I am afraid that they may slowly send these missiles to us, even with European money». This means the problem is not only the physical availability of missiles — but distribution priorities.

Not the first time — but this openly for the first time

In autumn 2024, Zelensky had already warned about a shortage of Patriot and NASAMS missiles: partners delayed deliveries because Russian drones were flying into Polish territory and other NATO countries, which focused on their own defense. Zelensky then directly suggested that Moscow could be doing this deliberately — to divert Western attention from Ukraine before winter.

Now the mechanism is different, but the result is similar. The war in Iran has consumed a significant portion of U.S. and allied PAC-3 MSE stockpiles. Compared to how carefully Ukraine uses each missile, Middle Eastern expenses, according to analysts, exceed Ukrainian use several times over.

What those tracking this issue say

Former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker confirmed Zelensky's assertion: the shortage of Patriot missiles is real and growing. At the same time, he pointed to a potential solution — cooperation with Persian Gulf countries. Zelensky, by the way, has already visited the region and, according to him, Ukraine is ready to share air defense experience — and even sell systems it has in surplus.

But the focus is on PAC-3 specifically, which no one has in surplus. Even Germany, which recently sent Ukraine a new batch, assembled it piece by piece from several countries within Ramstein agreements.

Why now and who benefits from disclosing this

Zelensky speaks about «critical shortage» not in a closed letter to partners — but in a live broadcast on ZDF and CNN. This is public pressure: on Berlin, Washington, Brussels. Before any negotiations about supporting Ukraine, the public opinion in Europe needs to understand the real state of affairs, rather than live in the illusion that «missiles are being sent somehow».

  • Russia continues regular ballistic strikes — precisely what PAC-3 is the only reliable means against among those available to the Armed Forces.
  • The production line physically cannot simultaneously cover two active theaters of war at current rates.
  • PAC-3 alternatives for ballistic interception in the Armed Forces essentially do not exist — NASAMS and Gepard are effective against cruise missiles and drones, but not against Iskanders.

The Pentagon's $4.7 billion contract with Lockheed Martin is a signal that the problem is recognized. But new capacity will not become operational before several years pass. Russia will not wait until 2030.

If the West does not find a mechanism for prioritized distribution of PAC-3 between Ukraine and its own needs already this year — rather than after the completion of the Iranian campaign — will Ukrainian air defense be able to withstand the next season of massive ballistic strikes without critical breakthroughs?

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