Systematic work instead of spectacular strikes

An NV interview with the commander of the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces with the call sign Charlie confirms: strikes on drone factories in 2025 were effective, but their demonstrative effect does not solve the problem systemically. Systematic work, which does not always make headlines, delivers longer‑lasting and broader results — which is why, by decision of the military‑political leadership, the focus has shifted.

Why the change of priorities is not a retreat

The reason is simple: the Russians began to disperse production and use complex supply chains that partially circumvent Western sanctions. Therefore, directly eliminating individual sites produces a short‑term effect — but does not stop the supply of components. Analysis after a series of strikes showed that it is not enough to destroy a few factories if the enemy's financial and logistical base remains functional.

"They distribute everything very intelligently across other locations. They start pushing it out to distances we currently cannot reach. But after a series of such strikes, we did observe certain production disruptions."

— Charlie, commander of the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces (interview with NV)

Evidence on the ground — operations by the SBU, the Navy and the SSO

Individual operations confirm: strikes on logistics and warehouses yield results that are harder to recover from. In 2025 several key hits were recorded:

• January — the SBU and the Navy struck a warehouse with reconnaissance drones in the Rostov region;
• July — a facility producing warheads for 'Shaheds' was struck near Moscow;
• 6 November — the SSO released footage of a strike on a 'Shaheds' base in Donetsk (about 90% of the drones reached the target during the attack);
• 29 November — in the "Alabuga" zone a battery warehouse burned over an area of more than 5,000 m².

What undermining the enemy's economic potential achieves

Instead of chasing hard‑to‑reach sites, focusing on financial flows, logistics and the supply of components reduces Russia's ability to quickly restore production. This works on several levels: it raises the cost of recovery, delays delivery timelines and increases the cost per unit of weaponry. Analysts and military experts agree that such a strategy yields a greater strategic effect in the medium term.

Conclusion

Tactical victories at the level of individual workshops are important for morale and tactical status, but the priority now is systematic suppression of the enemy's economic capabilities. Whether Moscow will find new supply channels and how quickly that would mean the restoration of 'Shaheds' in quantity is a question for its partners and for further intelligence. For us the task is simple: turn individual strikes into a lasting systemic effect that hits the aggressor's wallet and weakens its ability to wage war.