Brief and important

Journalists from The Insider identified around 300 intermediary companies that systematically supplied goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. The analysis relied on internal supply data and customs statistics for 2024 — and opens up the possibility of delivering a significant blow to Russia's supply chains.

"We were able to identify about three hundred companies that regularly serviced key defense industry enterprises."

— The Insider, journalistic investigation

What was discovered

Data show: about 10,000 Russian companies imported sanctioned goods worth more than $22 billion in 2024. Of these, more than 2,000 were counterparties of leading defense enterprises, supplying goods worth ~$1 billion. To filter out one-off transactions, journalists set a threshold — only those counterparties that supplied more than 1 million rubles (~$13,000) were included in the final list.

Important: the list of ~300 companies is the "tip of the iceberg." The analysis covered only 160 key defense enterprises and only direct transactions; many supplies pass through longer networks of intermediaries that are harder to trace.

Which components are vulnerable

The investigation highlights several critical imports on which the Russian defense sector is heavily dependent: FPGAs (field-programmable gate arrays) — key for missile and drone navigation; Japanese laser etching systems; British sensors for coordinate measuring machines; and metalworking machine tools from Taiwan, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Why this matters for Ukraine

Systematic blocking or freezing of supply chains makes Russian production vulnerable not only technically but also temporally — factories may find themselves able to produce less, more slowly, and with lower quality. For Ukraine, this means a reduction in the intensity of the adversary's offensive capabilities and less resource pressure on the front.

What effect sanctions could have

In theory, the synchronized imposition of sanctions against the identified 300 companies could quickly complicate the supply of critical components. In practice — effectiveness will depend on three factors: the accuracy of intelligence, the speed of coordination among partners, and the incorporation into sanctions policy of mechanisms to close off workarounds.

What the international community should do

What is needed is more than a declaration: coordinated, simultaneous measures to shut financial channels, freeze assets, and control the export of key technologies. Analysts emphasize that action must be taken quickly — while the identified network nodes have not yet had time to rebuild their chains.

Conclusion

The Insider's investigation provides a snapshot of the system that keeps the Russian defense industry afloat. It is not an instant "off switch," but it is a clear action plan for political decisions. Now the question is for the partners: can they turn the journalists' list into a coordinated package of measures that will genuinely complicate the supply of Russian weapons?