Briefly

At the end of January UTC (a company owned by the telecom holding Veon, the owner of Kyivstar) filed an application with the AMCU (Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine) to acquire control over the assets of UNS — a tower platform that works with “Vodafone Ukraine.” In response, one of the members of the “big three,” lifecell, published a statement warning of the risk of monopolization of the tower market and a possible slowdown in infrastructure development.

lifecell’s position

"The merging of passive mobile infrastructure of the two largest operators will lead to monopolization and a structural imbalance in the telecom market, which may affect the pace of innovation and weaken the focus on subscribers’ needs. The consequences of this transaction will extend far beyond the mobile communications market."

— lifecell, company statement

The statement also emphasizes that the diversity of infrastructure helped ensure the operation of the defense forces, emergency services, and support for subscribers during a cyberattack on one of the operators in 2023.

Context and motivation of the deal

UTC and UNS are companies that build and maintain base stations and lease them out. Tower consolidation allows operators to reduce capital expenditures, optimize network coverage, and speed up service rollouts. Part of this logic follows investor expectations: in 2024 Turkcell sold lifecell to the investment company NJJ Holding of Xavier Niel, which is forming a broader telecom group based on lifecell and Datagroup‑Volia. This changes incentives and dampens competition for infrastructure assets.

What this means for subscribers and security

The merging of towers can bring technical benefits — lower maintenance costs and potentially faster scaling of services. But the risks are clear: reducing the number of independent infrastructure owners lowers market competition, may restrain innovation, and decreases incentives to improve service. Separately, there is the question of redundancy and network resilience: fewer owner‑operators of infrastructure makes network chains more vulnerable during cyberattacks or armed conflict.

Regulatory perspective

The application has been submitted to the AMCU, and it is up to the regulator to assess whether the deal will create risks to competition. Possible tools range from obligations for open access to assets to structural remedies or refusal to approve. Analysts note that the solution must combine economic efficiency with security guarantees.

Conclusion

This case is more than another business transaction: it is about who will control critical communications infrastructure during war and reconstruction. Whether a balance can be found between efficiency and competition depends on the AMCU’s decision and how transparently the parties are willing to agree on compensatory measures. Attention should be paid not only to legal formalities but to how the deal’s consequences will be felt by Ukrainians in voice, internet, and emergency service performance.