Russia is currently short of at least 1.5 million workers — and that's only to return to labor market equilibrium, according to Bloomberg's assessment. But the real problem isn't the current figure, but rather that even a ceasefire won't solve it.

Where the shortage comes from

Three flows have simultaneously reduced Russia's workforce since 2022. The first is mobilization: according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia has suffered approximately 1.2 million casualties, of which 325,000 were killed as of early 2026. The second is emigration: between 820,000 and over 900,000 people left after the full-scale invasion began, and although Bloomberg estimates that 40–45% of emigrants have returned, a significant portion has remained abroad. The third is demographics, which existed before the war: in 2024, Russia saw 1.22 million births while 1.82 million people died — and these figures do not include military losses.

According to Le Monde citing Rosstat, in just the first two months of 2025, the birth rate fell another 3% compared to 2024. Russia's Labor Minister Anton Kotyakov acknowledged at a meeting with Putin in July that by 2030, the economy needs to integrate 10.9 million people, of which 10.1 million is simply replacing those who will retire. He proposed no solutions.

What this means for the economy right now

The labor shortage is already rewriting the macroeconomic picture. The average salary in Russia in May 2025 reached 99,422 rubles — a year-on-year increase of 14.5%. In real terms, this is only +4.2% due to inflation. But what's critical for business is something else: the share of labor costs in GDP for the first quarter of 2025 rose to 50.2% from 46.8% a year ago, while the share of profits fell from 44.5% to 41.9%, according to Rosstat.

«The pressure of elevated wages on added value has reached an absolute maximum across a wide range of sectors».

Dmitry Belousov, analytical center TSEMAKP (affiliated with the Russian government)

Alfa Bank's chief economist Natalia Orlova points to a less obvious signal: a slowdown in vacancy placements — this is not a sign that tension is easing, but evidence that employers are simply tired of searching for candidates who don't exist. Central Bank of Russia head Elvira Nabiullina publicly acknowledged in April 2026 that Russia has never faced such a labor shortage in modern history, calling it one of two key risks for inflation.

A forecast that doesn't depend on the front

The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs forecasts that by 2030, the shortage will grow to 3 million workers. Gazprombank currently estimates the need at 1.8 million — given that the total number of unemployed in the country is only 1.7 million. That is, even if absolutely all unemployed people were employed, the shortage wouldn't disappear.

The structural trap looks like this: a high key rate (21%) restrains investment in automation, which could compensate for the lack of people; meanwhile, wage growth drives inflation, forcing the Central Bank to keep rates high. Breaking this cycle without sharp cuts to military spending is mathematically difficult.

If hostilities cease and some of the mobilized return to the labor market — will that be enough to stop the structural demographic decline that Russia has been accumulating for two decades?