Tuesday, May 26, 2026
Today's Edition

EveryNews

Stories that matter, signal over noise

Business

Rostov Company Leased Five Luhansk Mines—and Went Bankrupt Without Paying Wages

# Translation "The trading house 'Donetsk Coal' received mines with a promise to invest 40 billion rubles, but instead left miners without money and initiated its own bankruptcy. This is not an isolated failure — this is a model.

Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

By Tetiana Suchkova-Ladik

April 27, 2026 · 2 min read

Rostov Company Leased Five Luhansk Mines—and Went Bankrupt Without Paying Wages
Копер шахти "Червоний партизан" (Фото: Fedir.hladkykh, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

In March 2026, three mines in Luhansk Oblast closed: "Red Partisan" in Voznesenkivka, "Dozhanska-Kapitalna," and the Sverdlov mine in Dozhansk. Miners did not receive wages for either December 2025 or the months they worked in 2026.

"People were simply thrown onto the streets"

— Red Partisan miner Anatoly, as quoted by The Moscow Times

In January, management had still been reporting "reductions aimed at optimizing the organizational structure." By March, the enterprises simply shut down. Shortly thereafter, their operator — the Rostov-based LLC "Don Coal Trading House" — initiated its own bankruptcy proceedings. The total amount of claims against the company at the beginning of 2026 reached nearly 2 billion rubles.

How it began: a lease with conditions that no one fulfilled

In February 2024, the occupation administration transferred five mines in Luhansk Oblast to "Don Coal" under a lease agreement with the right to purchase them after five years, provided that at least 40 billion rubles were invested in production. Later, five more mines were added to the lease. In August of the same year, 90% of the company was transferred to Oleg Knyazev, the former vice-premier of the Astrakhan Oblast government, who shortly thereafter resigned.

Even before the mines closed, the Luhansk regional administration documented the dismantling of equipment at "Red Partisan" and "Dozhanska-Kapitalna": everything that could be cut was transported to Russia. In other words, the "investor" acted in the exact opposite way — not investing, but extracting.

Why the market won't save it

According to energy expert Omelchenko, Donbas coal was largely unprofitable even before the occupation — only a few mines were profitable. The situation is now worse: Russian coal is under EU sanctions, China is reducing its imports, and the cost of underground coal mining in Donbas is significantly higher than in Kuzbas, where coal is extracted by open-pit mining.

According to researchers, since the start of the full-scale invasion, the number of operating mines in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has decreased from 114 to approximately 15. Along with the mines, coking plants, metallurgical facilities, and the chemical industry are disappearing — the entire technological chain that had been built over decades.

  • Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant — destroyed during the 2022–2024 fighting
  • Mariupol metallurgical plants — shut down or destroyed
  • Azot chemical plant in Sievierodonetsk — put out of service

The closure of three mines in Dozhansk is neither an accident nor a result of military operations. It is the result of a scheme: transfer an asset to a loyal company, allow equipment to be exported, then declare bankruptcy and leave workers unpaid.

If the occupation administration continues to transfer mines using the same model — without real oversight of investment obligations — the question is not whether the next enterprises will close, but how many more miners will be left without wages by the time it becomes public.

Related

Latest

Business

EU Against Google: Why the Latest Fine Could Change More Than Previous Ones

# European Regulators Target Google Again — This Time Over Digital Markets Act Violations. What's Behind the Accusations and Why It Matters Beyond the Corporation European regulators have renewed their scrutiny of Google, this time focusing on alleged violations of the Digital Markets Act. The charges underscore Brussels' increasingly aggressive stance on big tech monopolies and what officials say are anticompetitive practices. The accusations center on how Google leverages its dominance across multiple digital services — from search to advertising to mobile platforms — to disadvantage competitors. Regulators claim the company is using its market power in ways that stifle innovation and limit consumer choice. The case carries significance far beyond Google itself. It signals how the EU is attempting to enforce its landmark Digital Markets Act, legislation designed to curb the gatekeeping power of tech giants. A potential penalty could set precedent for how other large technology companies face similar scrutiny. For consumers and smaller tech firms, the outcome could reshape the digital landscape by creating more room for competition. For Google, fines and operational restrictions could fundamentally alter its business model in Europe, the world's most stringent regulatory market. The case also reflects a broader geopolitical divide, with the EU pursuing a regulatory approach that contrasts sharply with the lighter-touch oversight favored in the United States.

May 26, 2026