Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service handed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy internal Russian documents with assessments of economic losses from the war. The key point here is not the leak itself, but its source: this is not Western analytics and not opposition calculations. This is what the Kremlin considers to be the truth for internal use.

What's in the documents

Zelenskyy named three indicators. The first is the reduction of active oil wells. According to him, just one company — and not the largest — closed about 400 wells. A critical detail: restarting oil wells in Russia is technologically more complex than in other oil-producing countries, meaning these are not temporary losses.

The second indicator is a decline in oil refining of at least 10% over several months of the current year. The third is a federal budget deficit that has already exceeded $80 billion in just the first five months of the year.

«It is important that this is precisely a Russian internal assessment that they are trying to hide both from the world and from the internal Russian audience».

Volodymyr Zelenskyy

What independent data verifies

The figures do not contradict what external analysts are recording. According to OilPrice.com, Russia's oil revenues fell by 24% in 2025 — to the lowest level since 2020. The federal budget deficit for the year reached $72 billion with record military spending of $145 billion. The National Wealth Fund — the Kremlin's main financial cushion — shrunk from $113 billion to $52.2 billion in liquid assets since the start of the full-scale invasion, meaning it fell by more than half.

Economists from Russia's Presidential Academy (RANEPA) and the Gaidar Institute warned back in 2025: if the trend does not change, the fund could be depleted by 2026.

Why this is more than just statistics

Oil is not an abstract balance sheet item. It still provides about a quarter of Russia's federal budget, from which the army, social payments, and regional subsidies are financed. A reduction in production at low prices for Urals ($39 per barrel in December 2024 compared to pre-war levels) creates a scissors effect: revenues fall while war spending increases.

Economist Torbjørn Becker, speaking before EU finance ministers, noted that Russia is «strong enough to continue financing the war, but that is different from being economically strong». Inflation, labor shortage of 1.9 million people in industry, and the collapse of foreign investment create a vicious circle — more money without real growth accelerates prices further.

• Oil refining — minus 10% over several months of 2025
• Closed wells — ~400 in just one company, restart technologically limited
• Budget deficit — over $80 billion in the first five months
• Wealth Fund — liquid assets fell by half since the start of the invasion

What remains unknown

The Foreign Intelligence Service did not reveal which company closed 400 wells or how the documents came into Ukrainian intelligence hands. It is impossible to verify internal figures through open Russian sources — Rosstat and the Finance Ministry publish aggregated data with delays and methodological changes that have made them increasingly less suitable for comparison since 2022.

So the situation is paradoxical: a leak from Moscow may be more accurate than official Moscow statistics.

If the deficit continues to grow at the pace of the first five months, and the price of Urals does not return above $60, the National Wealth Fund could be depleted by the end of 2026 — and then the Kremlin will have to choose between the army and social obligations within the country.