19,481 respondents in 15 countries — such is the scope of a new survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), conducted in May 2025. The central question: do Europeans support EU expansion to the east through Ukraine's accession?

Where "no" sounds loudest

The figures by leading opposition countries are telling. 47% of Hungarians consider Ukraine's accession a bad idea — against only 15% who support it. In Bulgaria — 46% against 19%, in Austria — 42% against 24%.

A surprise — Estonia. One of Kyiv's most consistent allies at the government level shows a result that doesn't fit the "Baltic narrative": 37% of Estonians consider expansion a bad idea, 32% — a good one. As ECFR notes, this is not a rejection of the expansion idea as such, but a caveat formulated as "in the current context".

Where support exceeds expectations

Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands — the most progressive on Ukraine's accession. The Netherlands here is a separate detail: the country has traditionally been considered skeptical of EU expansion, but now its public opinion is leaning toward support.

Overall across all 15 countries, 32% support eastward expansion, 30% — against. The difference is minimal, which means:

• There is no consensus in the EU.
• However, there is no mass rejection either.
• In each country, a significant portion of citizens simply refuses to take a position — and it is this electorate that will decide the direction.

Why the "geography of support" is a paradox

Logic suggests: the closer to war — the better they understand the stakes. But ECFR data destroys this connection. Poland and Estonia — Ukraine's neighbors — demonstrate a split in opinions similar to France and Germany. Meanwhile, Portugal and Spain, which border neither Russia nor Ukraine, emerged as leaders in support.

"There is no public consensus on Ukraine's EU accession in the current context — even among geographically closest neighbors".

— ECFR, report "Home Alone", 2025

ECFR explains this not by rejection of the expansion idea, but by different perceptions of risk and time horizon. Citizens of Sweden or Portugal are not experiencing either migration pressure or economic competition for EU funds as acutely as Central European countries.

What this means for the negotiation process

EU accession requires unanimity of all 27 member states. Hungary is already demonstrating that government and public opinion can coincide in blocking — and this is a different scenario than when Orbán acts against his voters.

At the same time, ECFR records that in all surveyed countries (except Bulgaria) the majority of citizens believe: if their country is attacked, other EU members will come to help. That is, solidarity in the security sphere is perceived much broader than a joint expansion project.

If by the next elections in Bulgaria and Hungary opposition forces cannot reverse the public narrative on EU expansion — Kyiv will face a situation where blocking will have not only political, but also democratic legitimacy.